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Abstract This paper proposes that risk aversion
encourages individuals to invest in balanced skill
profiles, making them more likely to become entre-
preneurs. By not taking this possible linkage into
account, previous research has underestimated the
impacts of both risk aversion and balanced skills on
the likelihood individuals choose entrepreneurship.
Data on Dutch university graduates provide an illus-
tration supporting our contention. We raise the
possibility that even risk-averse people might be
suited to entrepreneurship; and it may also help
explain why prior research has generated somewhat
mixed evidence about the effects of risk aversion on
selection into entrepreneurship.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  Jack-of-all-trades 
Risk Human capital Occupational choice  Balanced
skills
JEL Classifications D81  J24  L26  M13
1 Introduction
Two of the most influential theories of individual
selection into entrepreneurship are based on the
concepts of risk aversion, RA (Kihlstrom and Laffont
1979), and balanced skills, BS (Lazear 2005). Specif-
ically, if entrepreneurship is a more risky occupation
than paid employment, and if individuals vary in their
aversion to risk, then it follows that the least risk-
averse people are most likely to become the entrepre-
neurs (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979). Moreover,
because entrepreneurship requires expertise in a
variety of roles while paid employment rewards
specialists, people with balanced skills are most likely
to become entrepreneurs as well (Lazear 2005).
Despite the prominence and continued influence of
the RA and BS theories, the evidence for them is
decidedly mixed. For example, many psychology-
based studies have failed to detect any difference
The authors, listed in alphabetical order, are grateful to Peter
Berkhout for his contribution to the data analysis and Peter
Thompson for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual
disclaimer applies.
C. Hsieh
Yonsei University, UIC 406 Veritas Hall C, 85
Songdogwahak-ro, Yeonsu-gu, Incheon 406-840, South
Korea
e-mail: c.hsieh@yonsei.ac.kr
S. C. Parker
Western University, Ivey-New Building 2353, 1255
Western Road, London, ON N6G 0N1, Canada
e-mail: sparker@ivey.uwo.ca
C. M. van Praag
Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
C. M. van Praag (&)
University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15953,
1001 NL Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: mvp.ino@cbs.dk
123
Small Bus Econ (2017) 48:287–302
DOI 10.1007/s11187-016-9785-y
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in terms
of their risk attitudes (Brockhaus 1980; Shaver and
Scott 1991). Meta-analyses of risk aversion and
entrepreneurial selection have also generated conflict-
ing results (Stewart and Roth 2001; Miner and Raju
2004), with Miner and Raju (2004) concluding that the
available evidence about the validity of the RA theory
is inconclusive. Economics-based studies have also
generated mixed findings (Astebro et al. 2012). While
some research suggests that entrepreneurs are indeed
typically less risk-averse than employees (Cramer
et al. 2002; Ekelund et al. 2005; Ahn 2010; Brown
et al. 2011), others have reported insignificant differ-
ences between these groups (Barsky et al. 1997;
Parker 2008). Still others have found an association
between risk aversion and entrepreneurial entry (Si-
mons and Astebro 2010), a non-monotonic relation-
ship between risk aversion and the entrepreneur’s
work commitment (Elston et al. 2005), and a depen-
dency of the relationship between risk aversion and
entrepreneurship on other factors such as education
(Polkovnichenko 2002). And while several studies
have measured balanced skills in terms of the number
of prior job roles, and have generated evidence
consistent with the BS theory (Lazear 2005; Wagner
2006; Hartog et al. 2010; Astebro and Thompson
2011), the robustness of these results has been called
into question (Silva 2007).
While RA and BS remain popular and influential
theories, not least because of their persuasive and
attractive internal logics, their lack of clear empirical
support raises several troubling questions. For exam-
ple, does the inconclusive evidence about the role of
risk aversion mean that any differences of this sort do
not actually affect occupational choice, perhaps
because other factors dominate this choice (or because
paid employment is also risky: Parker 1997)? Like-
wise, have the estimates of skill balance been weak-
ened by using a flawed proxy, namely the number of
prior job roles—or are they actually a mirage,
masquerading as hard-to-measure personal abilities
(Silva 2007; Hartog et al. 2010), or preferences such
as a ‘taste for variety’ (Astebro and Thompson 2011)?
Lacking answers to these questions, our knowledge
about reasons why people become entrepreneurs is
bound to remain limited.
This paper proposes a different argument which
may shed light on this issue. Previous work has indeed
examined the effects of both risk aversion and skill
balance on the entrepreneurial entry decision, but
treating them as independent variables (e.g., Lazear
2005: 672). We instead propose that balanced skills
and risk aversion are not independent and should be
studied and examined empirically in tandem. Given
evidence that risk-averse actors like to diversify their
human capital (e.g., Amihud and Lev 1981), one might
expect highly specialized employees to be left with
few competitive options if returns from specialism
suddenly become less valuable in fast-changing,
uncertain environments (Abernathy and Wayne
1974). Then risk-averse individuals who fear the loss
of flexibility associated with highly specialized human
capital may respond by diversifying their human
capital investments. As a result, risk-averse people
could ironically end up acquiring exactly the balanced
skill sets which are especially conducive to
entrepreneurship.
As well as being of interest in its own right, the
possibility that risk aversion and balanced skills are
positively related implies, as we go on to show, that
empirical studies (which have ignored this interde-
pendence hitherto) might have underestimated both of
their impacts on entrepreneurial selection. In princi-
ple, this point might help to explain the mixed body of
evidence pertaining to the RA and BS theories.
The paper makes the following contributions. First,
it extends our theoretical understanding of
entrepreneurship as an occupational choice by propos-
ing a novel association between the two hitherto
separate concepts of risk aversion and balanced skills.
Our simple formulation extends the theory of BS from
a certain environment (as in Lazear 2005) to a risky
one. Risk is present in both occupations; and the
acquisition of balanced skills is treated as a choice
variable in our theory, rather than being taken as given
as in Lazear (2005).
Second, our theorizing proposes a richer empirical
specification of career choices between entrepreneur-
ship and wage employment, which is estimated using a
sample of recent graduates from Dutch universities.
The dataset has several attractive properties. One is
that, in line with our theory, the survey respondents
(who are sampled shortly after graduation) are homo-
geneous in terms of their education levels and labor
market experience. Consequently, differences in
human capital between individuals pertain (almost)
exclusively to skills balance, rather than to skills
levels. We deem this an advantage given
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Polkovnichenko (2002) insight that the risk of
entrepreneurship is lower when human capital is
greater, since human capital is homogeneous in our
dataset. Another interesting aspect of the dataset is that
it enables us to depart from the conventional practice
of proxying skills balance by the variety of prior labor
market experience. The latter may be associated with
unobserved abilities (Silva 2007). Instead, we propose
a novel measure of skills balance based on the
observed multi-industry versatility of degree majors.
Thus, consistent with our theory, skills balance is
measured prior to when occupational choices are
observed, thereby avoiding problems of reverse
causality. However, we acknowledge upfront that we
are not able to eliminate common causation by an
unobservable individual-fixed variable. This weakness
remains with the field.
Third, the paper provides a platform for re-evalu-
ating mixed prior evidence from tests of the RA and
BS theories. It assesses empirically the implications of
omitting each of risk aversion and skill balance
measures from empirical models of entrepreneurship
and quantifies the biases that can result therefrom.
The next section outlines a simple model of skill
balance acquisition and occupational choice. The
sections that follow describe the empirical methods
and data, before presenting the empirical results. The
final section highlights some of the study’s limitations
and concludes.
2 The model
There is a unit mass of atomistic decision-making
individuals. There are two occupations, paid employ-
ment (P) and entrepreneurship (E), and two skills
which generate returns in both occupations, x1 and x2.
To abstract from issues of aggregate skill acquisition,
which is not of interest here, assume that every agent
obtains a unit endowment of total skill. This allows us
to use the more compact notation x1 ¼ x and x2 ¼
1 x hereafter. In E, both skills are needed for any
output to be produced, whereas in P, workers can
specialize in one skill. People specialize if they choose
x ¼ 1 or x ¼ 0. If 0\ x\ 1 they choose some
mixture of skills. The production technology which
maps x and 1 x into returns differs in each occupa-
tion, as described below.
The timing of events is as follows. Reflecting the
timing of choices in students’ lives, first in formal
education and then in the workforce, the model
comprises two stages. At stage one, individuals first
undergo schooling, at which point x is chosen. Here
we simply observe that x is defined in terms of the
balance of formal subject choices and the number of
jobs which majors in those subjects open students
up to (precise definitions are deferred to the data
section below). Students do not yet know their
idiosyncratic ability in either occupation; nor do
they know their future stochastic returns given those
abilities. There are therefore two sources of risk:
‘idiosyncratic’ risk (i.e., risk relating to the levels of
their own abilities) and ‘market’ risk (i.e., risk
relating to the returns to those abilities). Students
choose x ex ante, i.e., before they know which
occupation they will enter after leaving school.
However, they use all of the available information
when choosing x, namely the probabilities p and 1
p of eventually working in P and E, respectively. Once
students have determined their optimal x, denoted x,
its value is fixed thereafter. Since (as noted above) we
will be measuring x in terms of educational skill
balance, this modeling assumption also matches the
data at hand.
At stage two, students graduate and enter the
workforce. At this point, their abilities in the two
occupations are revealed. This resolves their idiosyn-
cratic risk—though their market risk remains. Only
now do they have enough information to make their ex
post occupational choice, which is conditioned on
their x determined at stage one.
First the model is outlined for the case of certainty.
This is the case analyzed by Lazear (2005) and others.
We then extend the (stage one) analysis to the case of
risk, analyzing the problem of choosing x to maximize
ex ante expected utility. Finally, we analyze ex post
(stage two) occupational choices.
Certainty Suppose specialization in x ¼ 1 yields the
return x1 in P, while specialization in x ¼ 0 yields
return x2 in P. According to Lazear (2005),
yP ¼ maxfx1;x2g. Hence workers do best specializ-
ing in one skill or the other: x 2 f0; 1g. In E, Lazear’s
return function is yE ¼ hminfx; 1 xg for h[ 1, so
entrepreneurs do best if they have balanced skills:
x ¼ 1
2
.
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For tractability, we will use generalized versions of
Lazear’s specifications which do not predetermine
x choices by assumption—and, more importantly,
which enable the model to be extended tractably to
deal with the case of risk. We will first show that our
specifications generate the same results in the case of
certainty. Our specifications of the returns in each
occupation are:
yPðxÞ ¼ x1xþ x2ð1 xÞ ð1Þ
yEðxÞ ¼ hxð1 xÞ : ð2Þ
In the benchmark case of certainty considered by
Lazear (2005), all parameters in the set X :¼
fx1 ; x2 ; hg are positive. It follows immediately that
workers do best with x ¼ 1 if x1[x2 and with x ¼ 0
ifx1\x2 (either solution is equally good ifx1 ¼ x2).
Entrepreneurs do best with x ¼ 1
2
. Hence employees
specialize in one skill while entrepreneurs have
balanced skills. Provided h[ 4maxfx1;x2g, indi-
viduals with balanced skills do best in E, whereas
those possessing specialized skills do best in P. These
predictions mirror Lazear’s.
Risk Now we move into more novel territory by
examining the roles of risk and risk preferences.
Consider the standard utility function
UðyÞ ¼ eky ; k[ 0 ð3Þ
where k is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
(ARA). To introduce idiosyncratic and market risk at
stage one, make X stochastic, with x1Nðl1; rPÞ,
x2Nðl2; rPÞ and hNðm; rE þ wÞ ex ante. Thus,
consistent with the bulk of the entrepreneurship
literature, we assume that market risk is concentrated
in entrepreneurship, through the variance term w[ 0:
market risk is never resolved and cannot be insured
against.1 However, all abilities are prone to idiosyn-
cratic risk, as reflected in the r variance components.
At stage one, a student uses this information to
calculate ex ante expected utility as
max
x
fpðxÞEUðyPÞ þ ð1 pðxÞÞEUðyEÞg ; ð4Þ
where p(x) and 1 pðxÞ are a student’s subjective
probabilities of subsequently entering P and E,
respectively. (It will be seen below that these proba-
bilities generally depend on x.) Once idiosyncratic risk
is resolved at stage two, students finally choose their
occupation. As is well known, the combination of
normally distributed payoffs with constant ARA
utility (3) gives rise to simple mean-variance utility
expressions (see, e.g., Sargent 1987: 154–155). So the
problem (4) can be rewritten as
max
x
pðxÞ l1xþl2ð1xÞðkrP=2Þ x2þð1 xÞ2
 h i
þð1pðxÞÞ mxð1xÞðk=2ÞðrEþwÞx2ð1xÞ2
h i
ð5Þ
We can now form the ex ante (i.e., stage one)
subjective probability that P is preferred to E. Returns
to skills are l1 ¼ l1 þ a1, l2 ¼ l2 þ a2 and
m ¼ mþ b: students do not know the values of a1,
a2 and b but know they are normally distributed with
means zero and variances rP, rP and rE, respectively.
Hence the ex ante probability that P will be preferred
to E after idiosyncratic risk is resolved is:
pðxÞ ¼ Pr EUðyPÞEUðyEÞ 
¼ Pr a1xþ a2ð1 xÞ  bxð1 xÞmxð1 xÞ½
l1x l2ð1 xÞ  ðkw=2Þx2ð1 xÞ2
i
¼1 Uð!ðxÞÞ ;
where UðÞ is the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution (with density function
/) and
!ðxÞ :¼mxð1 xÞl1xl2ð1xÞðkw=2Þx
2ð1 xÞ2ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rP x2þð1 xÞ2
 
þrEx2ð1 xÞ2
r :
The first- and second-order conditions for problem
(5) are, respectively,
J1 ¼½1 Uð!ðxÞÞ½l1  l2 þ krP  2krPx
þ Uð!ðxÞÞð1 2xÞ½m kðrE þ wÞxð1 xÞ
þ /ð!ðxÞÞ½EUðyEÞ  EUðyPÞ o!ðxÞ
ox
¼ 0
ð6Þ
1 All agents are assumed to know the parameters of all of these
normal distributions ex ante, which all have positive means and
variances. Similar results obtain if x1 and x2 also include
modest amounts of market risk; we suppress this complication
for simplicity.
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J2¼½1Uð!ðxÞÞ2krPUð!ðxÞÞ 2mþkðrEþwÞ

 1þ6xð1 xÞÞð þ2/ð!ðxÞÞo!ðxÞ
ox
o
ox
 EUðyEÞEUðyPÞ 
þ /0ð!ðxÞÞ o!ðxÞ
ox
 2
þ/ð!ðxÞÞo
2!ðxÞ
ox2
" #
½EUðyEÞEUðyPÞ
ð7Þ
In the following, we analyze the comparative statics
for an agent who is indifferent ex ante between E and
P. For these agents EUðyEÞ  EUðyPÞ ¼ 0 so the final
term of (6) equals zero. This leaves only the first line of
(7) in the second-order condition, which is certainly
negative, guaranteeing a maximum for this problem.
We make the following assumption of a lower
bound on the idiosyncratic risk in occupation P:
Assumption 1 rP[ ðrE þ wÞ=4.
Proposition 1 If Assumption 1 holds, greater risk
aversion is associated with a more balanced skill
profile among agents who are indifferent ex ante
between E and P.
Proof Implicit differentiation of (6) yields
ox
ok
¼  1 2x
J2
ð1 Uð!ðxÞÞÞrP
 Uð!ðxÞÞðrE þ wÞxð1 xÞ:
ð8Þ
For an indifferent agent U ¼ 1=2 so Assumption 1 is
sufficient to ensure the square bracketed term is
positive. Given J2\0, the sign of the derivative in (8)
then depends on x via the term 1 2x. By inspection,
this derivative is large and positive when x ¼ 0 and
decreases toward zero from above as x ! 1=2.
Conversely it is large and negative when x ¼ 1 and
increases toward zero from below as x ! 1=2. This
proves the proposition. h
Assumption 1 plays an important role because it
encourages risk-averse people to choose balanced skills
when they take into account the possibility that at stage
two they might be in P. If Assumption 1 did not hold,
risk-averse people could do better by choosing unbal-
anced skills, and taking their chances in P.
Stage 2 We now analyze the ex post occupational
choice problem at stage two, when students graduate
and enter the workforce. Unlike market risk, which
always remains, idiosyncratic risk is now resolved:
individual-specific mean returns to ability are revealed
to be l1, l2 and m. Thus x1 and x2 are no longer
stochastic, being l1 and l2; respectively; h remains
stochastic but now with hNð m;wÞ. Each individual
makes their occupational choice under conditions of
market risk and conditional on x.
Proposition 2 All else equal, an individual with a
more balanced skill profile is more likely than an
individual with a less balanced skill profile to choose
occupation E over P.
Proof Denote by x^ the values of x which make
individuals indifferent between P and E:
l1x^þ l2ð1 x^Þ ¼ mx^ð1 x^Þ  kwx^2ð1 x^Þ2=2 :
ð9Þ
The LHS of (9) is linear in x^; while the RHS is a \-
shaped quadratic in x^, with its maximum at one half.
Hence the probability that E is preferred to P is
maximized with balanced skills. If the LHS and RHS
intersect, there are two solutions to (9), denoted by
ðx^1; x^2Þ. Everyone with ex ante choices x\x^1 or
x[ x^2 chooses P, while everyone with x^1	 x 	 x^2
chooses E. Hence more balanced skills are associated
with the choice of E over P in an occupational choice
equilibrium. h
Proposition 2 suggests that Lazear’s well-known
occupational choice result extends to the new domain
of risky returns in paid employment and entrepreneur-
ship. Finally, we examine the effects of risk aversion
on occupational choice. Changes in k have ‘direct’ and
‘indirect’ effects on occupational choice. The direct
effect relates to risk averters’ dislike of payoff
variance. The indirect effect relates to the impact on
skill profiles (Proposition 1) which affect mean
returns. The following proposition states the result:
Proposition 3 (a) The direct effect of risk aversion
on occupational choice is to promote P over E; (b) The
indirect effect of greater risk aversion is to promote E
over P.
Proof (a) The direct effect of an increase in k on
occupational choice can be seen by inspection of (9).
A greater k decreases the height of the quadratic return
function in E without affecting its skew. This increases
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x^1 and decreases x^2, so the likelihood of E being
preferred to P decreases.
(b) Proposition 1 established that the indirect effect
of greater k on balanced skills is positive for individ-
uals who are on the occupational choice margin ex
ante. Proposition 2 established that a more balanced
skill set increases the attractiveness of E relative to
P—whence the result follows. h
Proposition 3 suggests that balanced skills have
subtle implications for the effects of risk aversion on
ex post occupational choice. On the one hand, when
market risk is present, the direct effect of risk aversion
induces risk-averse people to choose paid employment
over entrepreneurship. This is the well-known effect
studied in previous research. On the other hand,
because greater risk aversion encourages people
facing idiosyncratic risk to acquire more balanced
skill sets ex ante, and because balanced skills are more
valuable in entrepreneurship ex post, greater risk
aversion also serves to eventually make entrepreneur-
ship more attractive relative to paid employment
through the indirect balanced skills channel.2 An
empirical analysis of risk aversion and balanced skills
in entrepreneurship needs to take account of these
distinct mechanisms.
3 Empirical methodology and data
3.1 Empirical methodology
Empirical analyses of entrepreneurship as an occupa-
tional choice usually utilize regressions which include
either risk aversion or balanced skills variables, but
not both. Below, we first outline the implications for
tests of the RA and BS theories when one or other of
the variables measuring risk aversion or balanced
skills is omitted. We also explain our empirical
strategy for testing the Propositions developed in the
previous section when both variables are present.
Consider the following equation to be estimated
using a sample of individuals i:
zi ¼ b0 þ b1ki þ b2SBi þ b3Xi þ ui i ¼ 1; . . .; n
ð10Þ
where zi is a latent variable underlying a binary
occupational choice variable such that
zi ¼
1 if i chooses entrepreneurship: zi [ 0
0 if i chooses paid employment: zi 	 0
	
ð11Þ
Here ki and SBi are individual-level measures of risk
aversion and skill balance, respectively; Xi are a set of
orthogonal control variables and ui is a disturbance
term. According to Proposition 1, ki and SBi are
directly related; let c[ 0 denote the coefficient of
proportionality.
In terms of (10), Proposition 2 predicts b2[ 0,
while Proposition 3(a) predicts b1\0. We can now
deduce the bias that will occur if ki or SBi are omitted
from (10). First, consider the case where SBi is
omitted. Then a standard result in econometrics (e.g.,
Greene 2003) is that the bias from estimating b1 is
cb2—which is positive. Hence estimates of the risk
aversion effect on choice for entrepreneurship will be
upward biased, i.e., biased toward zero if b1\0. This
might explain why some studies which analyzed only
risk aversion and not balanced skills found small or
insignificant effects of risk aversion on entrepreneurial
selection. Second, consider the case where ki is
omitted. Now the bias from estimating b2 is cb1,
which is negative. Hence estimates of the balanced
skills effect on choice for entrepreneurship will be
downward biased, i.e., biased toward zero.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we
examine whether SBi and ki are positively related by
using OLS to estimate c in a regression of SBi on ki.
This tests Proposition 1. Second, we estimate the
effects of SBi and ki by applying probit methods to
(10) and (11). This tests Propositions 2 and 3(a). In
each of these cases, we also take account of the
possibility that skill balance and unobservables affect-
ing occupational choices are more similar within
degree fields than between them. We do so by
2 Notice the importance of idiosyncratic risk and the two-stage
model structure for generating this result. If in contrast
individuals had been modeled to choose x simultaneously with
their occupation, then the Envelope Theorem would make the
indirect effect zero. To see this, label the difference between the
LHS and RHS terms in (9) as z: then the derivative of the indirect
effect is:
oz
ok
¼ oz

ox
ox
ok
:
This would equal zero since the first-order condition would be
oz
ox ¼ 0.
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additionally reporting clustered standard errors by
degree field j (j ¼ 40). We also provide estimates
using robust estimation techniques to correct for
heteroskedasticity.
Third, we statistically test the biases predicted
above, which can be summarized as b1\½b1jb2 ¼ 0
and b2[ ½b2jb1 ¼ 0. This tests Proposition 3(b).
Taking the case of b1\½b1jb2 ¼ 0 first, there are
two steps to performing the test. First, (10) is estimated
twice using Seemingly Unrelated Estimation. The first
estimation includes SB and the second excludes it.
This generates two sets of parameters and variance-
covariance matrices.3 Second, a Chi-squared statistic
is computed and a test is performed to determine
whether the differences between the two estimates of
b1—the first of which left b2 unrestricted and the
second of which restricted it to zero—are statistically
significant (see Clogg et al. 1995, for details). Finally,
for the case b2[ ½b2jb1 ¼ 0 this procedure is then
repeated first including and then excluding k at the first
step.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Sample
Since 1999, the Dutch research institute SEO, in
collaboration with the prominent weekly magazine
‘Elsevier,’ has administered an annual survey
designed to measure labor market prospects of recent
graduates across colleges and universities in the
Netherlands. Respondents fill out extensive question-
naires (two Januarys after graduation) about their
tertiary education majors and secondary school
grades. Respondents also provide information about
their demographic backgrounds, current labor market
situations, occupational status (e.g., unemployed, self-
employed, wage-employed), and incomes. Because a
measure of risk aversion was obtained only in the
January 2004 interviews, we use data from that survey.
The final sample comprises 3002 respondents who
graduated in 2002 with a Master’s degree and who
were working as paid employed or self-employed in
January 2004.
An advantage of these data is that, consistent with
the theory expounded in the previous section, the
survey respondents are homogeneous in terms of their
education levels and labor market experience. They
differ, however, in terms of their investments in
balanced skills acquired during their schooling.
Moreover, the data are rich enough to measure
balanced skills in two distinct ways, as explained
below. Furthermore, because SB is determined (both
in theory as well as our data sample) prior to
occupational choices zi, our empirical approach is
not vulnerable to the kinds of reverse causality
problems that could affect ‘conventional’ measures
of skill balance such as numbers of different prior jobs,
for example. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there
might still be unobserved characteristics which are
correlated with both SB choices and subsequent zi
outcomes. Lacking instrumental variables in our
dataset which affect the choice for investing in
balanced skills but not the choice of entrepreneurship,
we cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity bias.
However, to the best of our knowledge, this limitation
affects all empirical work in this area, not just this
study.
3.2.2 Variables
Occupational choice: self-employment versus wage
employment Consistent with the data, we opera-
tionalize entrepreneurship as self-employment and use
as the dependent variable an indicator variable taking
the value one if the respondent is self-employed and
zero if they are wage-employed. Many scholars treat
self-employment as entrepreneurship (Elfenbein et al.
2010; Folta et al. 2010; Nanda and Sorensen 2010;
Astebro et al. 2012). Astebro and Thompson (2011),
in investigating the Jack-of-All-Trades and Taste for
Variety theories of entrepreneurship, find no qualita-
tive difference in results when entrepreneurship is
measured via self-employment, business creation, or
business ownership.
According to Table 1, only 2.8 % of the sample
was self-employed at the time of the 2004 survey. Low
rates of self-employment among recent graduates are
commonplace (Dolton and Makepeace 1990), owing
to insufficient time for recent graduates to accumulate
the financial and social capital needed to make a
success of self-employment. In this paper, we trade off
our sample’s modest post-university self-employment
rate for empirically useful homogeneity in human
3 The suest routine implements this procedure in STATA:
see Weesie (1999).
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capital as regards educational level and labor market
experience.
Risk attitude Respondents were asked to value
participation in a hypothetical lottery paying out 1000
euros with a 10 % chance of success. The reservation
price (p), i.e., WTP or Willingness to Pay, for
participating in such a hypothetical lottery has been
shown to be a valid (inverse) indicator of risk aversion
and behavior under risk (see Barsky et al. 1997;
Cramer et al. 2002; Dohmen et al. 2012). Risk neu-
trality would imply a reservation price of 100 and risk
aversion a price below 100. We measure risk aversion
as k ¼ 100 p. The average score on this measure of
risk aversion is 75.0 (with a standard deviation of
21.5), see Table 1. Furthermore, the average value of k
in the subset of self-employed is significantly lower
than in the subset of employees (k ¼ 67:4 vs.
k ¼ 75:3, p\0:01)—in line with earlier applications
(Cramer et al. 2002).
Skill balance Our objective is to measure choices of
(early) skill balance prior to the acquisition of labor
market experience by sample respondents. Our skill
balance variable (SB) is computed as the product of
two underlying measures. The first underlying mea-
sure, ‘Generality,’ captures the variety of industries
that a given degree major is observed to be used in. It
therefore captures an ‘external,’ usage-based aspect of
skill versatility. The second underlying measure,
‘Grade variance,’ records the spread of grades that
individuals achieve across three different secondary
school courses. It captures an ‘internal,’ i.e., individ-
ual-specific, aspect of balance of innate skill
competence.
Generality Some degree majors confer a skill set
which is useful in a variety of different industries after
graduation, whereas other majors have only a narrow,
or specialized, range of applicability. (In our dataset,
with only Master’s students, we expect that all
represented fields of study are adding value to the
human capital in the firm.) We define our Generality
measure as the total number of distinct industry sectors
employing graduates with a given major two years
after graduation, scaled by the number of students
graduating with that major. To minimize the impact of
outliers, we only define this variable for degree fields
with more than thirty graduates in the sample. Data on
both employees and the self-employed were used to
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construct this measure. Table 5 in Appendix lists all
academic majors, the numbers of associated respon-
dents, values of Generality, and self-employment
rates. Majors such as sociology, applied computer
science, languages and culture have high Generality
scores, whereas medical sciences ranks lower. Table 6
in Appendix lists the distinct industry sectors and the
number of observations in each sector.
Grade variance This construct measures the vari-
ation in grades received by respondents while in
secondary school. We posit that grades are an outcome
from talent as well as effort to understand course
material. Student choices about effort allocation
between academic courses therefore provide a partial
explanation of grade outcome variance. Some students
may choose to build on their strengths, while other
students choose to neglect amplifying their strength in
favor of reducing the liability of their weakness, thus
developing ‘well-roundedness.’ The smaller is grade
variance, the more balanced is a person’s foundation
of learning skills. Grade variance equates to
1 stdevða; b; cÞ, where a ¼ Grade Point Average
(GPA) in humanities and languages, b ¼ GPA in hard
sciences, and c ¼ GPA in behavioral sciences. Thus
greater values of our ‘grade variance’ operationaliza-
tion of skills balance corresponds with greater skills
balance, not less. The main reason for using this
nomenclature is that positive coefficients for either
skills balance variables carry the same interpretation.
Skill balanceWe acknowledge the shortcomings of
the Generality and Grade variance measures, espe-
cially when either is taken alone. ‘Generality’ on its
own says relatively little about skill balance at the
individual level, while ‘Grade variance’ on its own
does not capture the industry context and applicability
of diverse skills.4 Thus, to improve our operational-
ization of skill balance, we multiply ‘Generality’ and
‘Grade variance’ together to obtain a composite
explanatory variable, SB. By combining a measure
of skill balance which varies across degree fields with
a measure which varies across individuals, SB
provides a comprehensive overall measure of skill
balance obtained from early investments in skills. We
believe this is more informative than either of the
underlying measures alone. The main tables of results
below will present results based on SB, although for
completeness the ‘Appendix’ will also present results
obtained for each of the underlying measures.
Control variables Besides the key variables described
above, we include a set of control variables including
gender, age (varying from 22 to 29), parental educa-
tion levels (measured on a 1–5 scale), and ability
levels. The latter is measured as mean GPA scores
both in secondary and in tertiary education, expressed
on a scale from 1–10, where 6 is deemed a pass grade
in the Netherlands. Table 1 presents descriptive
statistics and correlations between the variables. There
are no obvious problems of collinearity. Self-employ-
ment is correlated negatively with risk aversion and
positively with ‘Generality’ (though not with ‘Grade
variance’), while risk aversion is associated positively
with skill balance. Interestingly, the two main mea-
sures of skill balance are negatively correlated,
suggesting that they are capturing distinct aspects of
SB.
4 Estimation results
We first test Proposition 1 by measuring the associ-
ation between skill balance, SB, and risk aversion, k,
among employees. Column I of Table 2 presents the
results for a ‘baseline’ specification without control
variables. It offers clear support for the proposition
that people who are more risk-averse acquire signif-
icantly more balanced skill sets. These results continue
to hold when control variables are included and
alternative estimation methods, namely robust esti-
mation and clustering, are used (columns II–IV). The
results for the two underlying SB measures can be
found in Appendix Table 7. Across the board, the
results support Proposition 1.
Next, we test Proposition 2 by estimating a probit
model of self-employment status. The results reported
in Table 3 display a significant positive effect from
SB. This supports Proposition 2 and is consistent with
the BS theory (and Astebro and Thompson (2011)
‘taste for variety’ argument)—as well as prior empir-
ical findings from Lazear (2005), Wagner (2006) and
Astebro and Thompson (2011). The positive
4 Previous measures of balanced skills have emphasized
individual-level variation, relying heavily on the number of
previous job roles (though Lazear 2005, also proposed the
diversity of subjects studied at college). Unlike numbers of job
roles, our SB variable is not time-varying, so panel data
estimation could not be used to control for person-specific fixed
effects as in Silva (2007), even if we had a panel.
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Table 2 Risk aversion and
skill balance (SB)
j ¼ 40 clusters. Absolute
t values are given in
parentheses. The sample
excludes self-employed
entrepreneurs. They are
based on robust estimates in
specifications I and II and
based on clustered estimates
in specifications III and IV
***, **, * denote
significance at the 1/5/
10 %-level
Variable Specification Specification Specification Specification
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Risk aversion (kÞ 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(3.020) (3.130) (2.870) (3.310)
Male 0.001 0.001
(0.700) (0.420)
Age (at graduation) 0.001 0.001
(1.600) (0.940)
Mother’s education 0.001 0.001
(1.040) (0.940)
Father’s education 0.000 0.000
(0.050) (0.060)
GPA_secondary 0.001 0.001
(0.570) (0.580)
GPA_tertiary 0.001 0.001
(0.440) (0.530)
Constant 0.029*** 0.047** 0.029*** 0.047
(11.94) (2.51) (11.18) (1.63)
N 2619 2596 2619 2596
R2 0.033 0.0055 0.0033 0.0055
F 9.14 2.27 8.25 2.14
Pr [F 0.0025 0.0268 0.0065 0.0619
Control variables included No Yes No Yes
Robust estimation Yes Yes No No
Clustered estimation (j = 40) No No Yes Yes
Table 3 Self-employed entrepreneurship, risk aversion and skill balance (SB)
Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
SB 2.5818* 2.7175** 2.9830** 3.0573**
(1.94) (2.08) (2.16) (2.29)
Risk aversion (kÞ 0.0073*** 0.0075*** 0.0064*** 0.0060***
(3.29) (3.32) (3.20) (2.68)
N 2692 2669 2692 2669 3002 2975
pseudo R2 0.0058 0.0313 0.0230 0.0458 0.0129 0.0313
Wald v2 3.78 27.00 13.00 38.99 9.91 23.93
Pr [ v2 0.0520 0.0003 0.0015 0.0000 0.0016 0.0012
Control variables included No Yes No Yes No Yes
Robust estimation No No No No Yes Yes
Clustered estimation ( j = 40) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
j ¼ 40 clusters. Absolute t values are given in parentheses. The results for specifications I–IV are obtained by clustered estimation
methods where each cluster is an education degree field (with nj[ 30 observations). The results are similar when applying robust
estimation instead of clustered estimation. Specifications V–VI do not include variables that require clustering
***, **, * denote significance at the 1/5/10 %-level. The controls included in specifications II, IV and VI are the same as in Table 2
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association between balanced skills and self-employ-
ment status hold irrespective of whether control
variables are included (specifications II and IV) or
not (specifications I and III). Including the risk
aversion variable, k, does not change this result either
(compare specifications I and II with III and IV). The
results continue to hold using the underlying measure
‘Generality,’ but not using the underlying measure
‘Grade variance’ (see Appendix Table 8 for details).
Table 3 reveals a significant negative association
between risk aversion and self-employment. This
result is consistent with both the RA theory and
Proposition 3(a). The significantly negative associa-
tion persists irrespective of whether we include control
variables [specifications IV and VI] or a measure of
balanced skills [specifications III and IV]. In addition,
the same results hold when the underlying measures of
balanced skills are used instead of SB (see Appendix
Table 8).
To obtain an indicator of the economic significance
of the result, we have calculated the marginal effect of
the probit estimates, evaluated at the mean values of
all the independent variables, for the fourth (most
parsimonious) specification in Table 3. At the mean
level of ‘balanced skills,’ a one standard deviation in
balanced skills (0.035) is associated with an increase
in the likelihood of self-employment of 0.6 %. At first
sight that may seem small; however, in the same
specification the predicted likelihood of self-employ-
ment (also evaluated at the sample means of all
independent variables) is 2.3 %. The percentage
increase in the likelihood of self-employment associ-
ated with a one standard deviation increase in balanced
skills is therefore 26 %, which is substantial. The
corresponding percentage increase in the likelihood of
self-employment associated with a decrease of one
standard deviation in the measure of risk aversion
(21.49) is even greater, at 38 %. Hence the measured
effects are not only statistically significant, but also
economically meaningful.
We also estimated Table 3 using a linear probabil-
ity model (LPM) as an alternative to the probit model
as a way of testing the robustness of the results (that
have been obtained with relatively few clustered
groups). Appendix Table 9 presents the LPM results.
The similarity of these results to what we show in the
main table suggests robustness. The signs and signif-
icance levels of the variables are similar in both tables.
Moreover, comparing the marginal effects derived
from the probit estimates to the LPM coefficients
shows that the magnitudes of the estimated associa-
tions are similar too.
As noted in Sect. 2, Proposition 3(b) follows log-
ically from Propositions 1 and 2, both of which
received empirical support above. And as noted in
Sect. 3, an implication of Proposition 3(b) is that
excluding SB from (10) will increase the estimate of
b1 in this equation, while excluding k from (10) will
reduce the estimate of b2. Inspection of Table 3
indicates that the coefficients change in the expected
directions when these exclusion restrictions are
imposed. But are these differences statistically signif-
icant? To answer this question, we adopt the testing
approach outlined in the previous section and report
the v2 statistics in Table 4. These results clearly show
that the expected biases are statistically significant.
With regard to the relationship between risk and
balanced skills, it is helpful to compare our findings
with those of Lazear (2005) and Astebro and Thomp-
son (2011). First, although Lazear (2005) measured
risk tolerance, whereas we measured risk aversion,
adding these different risk variables affected the skill
balance coefficient in a similar direction and magni-
tude. Lazear’s skill balance coefficient adjusted by
10.2 %, while ours adjusted in the same direction by
12.5 %. While we cannot verify the statistical signif-
icance of the difference in magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients on balanced skills for Lazear (2005), in our case
Table 4 Testing the indirect effect of risk aversion on self-
employment
v2-test Specification Specification
(I) (II)
Proposition 3b
b2[ b2jb1 ¼ 0
v2 4.18** 3.96**
P value 0.0410 0.0465
N 2692 2669
Corrolary
b1\b1jb2 ¼ 0
v2 5.55** 12.34***
P value 0.0185 0.0004
N 3002 2975
Control variables included No Yes
Clustered estimation ( j = 40) Yes Yes
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1/5/10 %-level
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the difference is statistically significant. Second,
Astebro and Thompson (2011) found that risk aversion
decreased the probability of choosing entrepreneur-
ship and decreased skill balance as well. The discrep-
ancy between our findings and those from Astebro and
Thompson (2011) is striking. Several reasons could
explain this, including differences in the data samples
and random effects, for example. Another possibility,
however, is that Astebro and Thompson (2011) used a
measure of risk aversion which is sensitive to career
context. Specifically, they measured risk aversion by
such survey items as ‘I would participate only in
business undertakings that are relatively certain’ and ‘I
probably would not take the chance of borrowing
money for a business deal even if it might be
profitable.’ They remarked that ‘it appears that those
who are more risk-averse are less likely to become
entrepreneurs, less likely to choose a variety of jobs,
and less likely to earn a high income’ (2011: 646). We
believe that there may be an alternative explanation:
that those who have (already) chosen to specialize,
based on gradual realization or identification of the
domains in which their strengths lie, will be biased
against taking risks in domains where they themselves
have realized they are weak.
Finally, if risk aversion has a negative direct, and a
positive indirect, effect on entrepreneurship, what is
the overall (net) effect and how does it vary across
sample cases? The estimated net effect of risk aversion
on entrepreneurship is certainly negative at the sample
mean; but it turns out to be positive for 12 % of the
sample cases. For these cases, the impact of risk
aversion on the acquisition of balanced skills is so
powerful that it actually turns risk aversion into a force
promoting entrepreneurship.
5 Conclusion
A popular economic theory of entrepreneurship is that
risk aversion decreases the likelihood of entrepreneur-
ship. More recently, researchers have begun to
embrace Lazear (2005) theory predicting that bal-
anced skills increase the likelihood of entrepreneur-
ship. Despite these clear-cut theoretical predictions,
empirical estimates of the effects of risk attitude and
skills balance on entrepreneurship choices have been
mixed. This paper has presented a two-stage theory of
choices of skill balance and occupational choice which
unify these two (hitherto weakly connected) strands of
theoretical work, and which may help explain the
inconclusive nature of prior empirical findings. In
contrast to research endowing skill balance and risk
with only independent effects, we have argued that
accurate estimation needs to take into account a
possible mediating relationship between these two
constructs. We propose that by making the acquisition
of balanced skills more attractive, risk aversion can
even end up as a positive force promoting
entrepreneurship—contrary to what might be expected
from theories of RA which ignore BS arguments.
Our measures of skill balance have enabled us to
conduct a first test of our theory, using two different
measures of skill balance: industry applicability of
university majors, and variance in grades across basic
coursework in secondary school. These measures have
the advantage of occurring prior to occupational
choices, though they might still be prone to endo-
geneity. We leave it to future research to propose and
investigate other possible variables which might be
free of possible endogeneity bias. We also leave it to
future research to investigate how the addition of
variables such as personality, access to capital and
prospective entrepreneurial setup costs might influ-
ence the relationships among risk aversion, skill
balance, and entrepreneurship.
Nevertheless, our arguments and empirical findings
may command interest beyond the community of
entrepreneurship scholars, including among practition-
ers and entrepreneurs. Our results reveal, perhaps
surprisingly, that some risk-averse people, long deemed
inherently ill-suited to entrepreneurship, might actually
be well-suited to this occupation after all. This insight
could have implications for entrepreneurship educators,
who often stress the ‘negative’ aspects of risk aversion
for entrepreneurship without suggesting any positive
aspects. It is also possible that young people underes-
timate the future value of acquiring balanced skills, for
instance by discounting the possibility of turning
entrepreneur later in life. Our research suggests that
the acquisition of balanced skills could be usefully
encouraged at school and university since it builds a
valuable future option for students.
It is also possible that some cultures or environments
succeed, either deliberately or otherwise, in fostering
balanced skills among their population, or in channeling
risk aversion into the acquisition of balanced skills. For
instance, formal education and corporate management
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training programs are known to differ in their emphasis
on specialized relative to balanced skill acquisition, or in
the temporality of such acquisition (Hsieh 2016). If
governments genuinely wish to encourage
entrepreneurship, a less specialized school curriculum
might be one indirect, and long-term, way of doing so.
Conversely, for firms concerned about losingemployees
to entrepreneurship (Hellmann 2007), specialists might
be favored over job candidates with balanced skills.
Extending the logic in this paper, one is led to wonder
whether there might be other counterintuitive indirect
relationships between balanced skills and individuals’
preferences or personality traits. For example, people
who have a ‘need for achievement’ may spend a decade
and longer in a single field of study in order to attain the
requisite expertise (Simon and Gilmartin 1973). In
contrast, those who have no such need for achievement
may dabble in whatever interests come their way,
culminating in a balanced skill profile. The same could
be trueofunconfident peoplehaving lowexpectationsof
their success or the rate of return to their human capital.
Instead of being jacks-of-all-trades, such individuals
might behave more like Astebro and Thompson (2011)
‘hobos.’ It would be interesting to explore how these
personality factors interface with skill acquisition at
school and university, varied job experience afterward,
and also participation in entrepreneurship.We leave this
issue for future research.
To conclude, this paper has proposed a novel
linkage between risk aversion and balanced skills
which casts theories of entrepreneurial selection in a
new light. The paper also carries implications for
scholars concerned with interpreting the body of
evidence on risk aversion and balanced skills theories
of entrepreneurship. And finally, its findings should
interest practitioners and educators who seek to
promote entrepreneurship as an occupational choice.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrest-
ricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, pro-
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Appendix
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Table 5 Key variables (mean) by degree field
Degree field (sample size) Generality Fraction Risk
aversion
Degree field
(sample size)
Generality Fraction Risk
aversionSelf-
employed
Self-
employed
Dutch (40) 0.15 0.13 86.18 Applied Comp Sciences (48) 0.15 0.02 77.54
English (37) 0.14 0.03 87.62 Applied Math/Physics (73) 0.11 0.01 72.78
Other Languages (30) – 0.07 84.50 Economics (104) 0.07 0.02 59.72
Philosophy, Theology (25) – 0.04 79.76 Management Studies (126) 0.06 0.01 71.55
History (62) 0.08 0.06 80.63 Econometrics (67) 0.10 0.01 54.52
Language and Culture, General
(33)
0.21 0.12 88.52 Fiscal Economics (24) – 0.00 58.96
History of Art (28) – 0.11 80.00 Business Studies (80) 0.09 0.08 65.66
Corporate Communication (19) – 0.00 78.95 Dutch Law (107) 0.06 0.01 74.56
Film, Television, Theater (26) – 0.08 92.77 Notarial Law (48) 0.08 0.00 77.77
Alpha Information Sciences (70) 0.10 0.03 71.41 Fiscal Law (69) 0.07 0.01 71.30
Chemistry (38) 0.11 0.00 81.63 Health Studies (103) 0.07 0.02 80.81
Computer Science (34) 0.15 0.03 73.79 Medical Science (119) 0.03 0.00 77.54
Biology (104) 0.07 0.05 80.63 Biomedical Science (84) 0.07 0.00 81.81
Pharmacy (36) 0.14 0.06 69.44 Veterinary Science (29) – 0.03 82.38
Theor. Math & Physics (53) 0.11 0.00 62.87 Sociology (32) 0.19 0.09 76.72
Gen. Applied Earth Science (37) 0.16 0.05 83.19 Psychology (112) 0.06 0.00 82.44
Bioprocessing & Food Tech (80) 0.09 0.00 83.19 Politicology (36) 0.19 0.03 80.28
Building Engineering &Arch (92) 0.07 0.07 76.27 Pedagogy (77) 0.10 0.00 80.16
Mechanical Engineering (80) 0.08 0.00 65.86 Applied Education Studies (43) 0.14 0.02 86.12
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Table 6 Industries Industry N
Public Sector 303
Education 629
Business Service 728
Financial Service 137
Health Sector 475
Manufacturing 264
Retail and other 457
Table 7 Risk aversion and
alternative measures of skill
balance
j ¼ 40 clusters. Absolute
t values are given in
parentheses. The sample
excludes self-employed
entrepreneurs. They are
based on robust estimates in
specifications I and II and
based on clustered estimates
in specifications III and IV
***, **, * denote
significance at the 1/5/
10 %-level
Specification Specification Specification Specification
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Panel A Generality
Risk aversion (kÞ 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*
(3.29) (3.39) (1.28) (1.68)
N 2707 2682 2707 2682
R2 0.036 0.018 0.0036 0.0018
F 10.80 7.24 1.65 2.48
Pr [F 0.0010 0.0000 0.2064 0.0329
Panel B Grade variance
Risk aversion (kÞ 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0007* 0.0008**
(2.27) (2.35) (1.90) (2.49)
N 2823 2798 2823 2798
R2 0.0018 0.0050 0.0018 0.0050
F 5.15 1.94 3.59 2.48
Pr [F 0.0234 0.0595 0.0641 0.0297
Control variables included No Yes No Yes
Robust estimation Yes Yes No No
Clustered estimation ( j = 40) No No Yes Yes
Table 5 continued
Degree field (sample size) Generality Fraction Risk
aversion
Degree field
(sample size)
Generality Fraction Risk
aversionSelf-
employed
Self-
employed
Electrical Engineering (53) 0.11 0.02 68.49 Cultural Anthropology (24) – 0.00 84.33
Chemical Engineering (42) 0.10 0.00 79.57 Communication Sciences (67) 0.10 0.01 77.24
Civil Engineering (91) 0.07 0.03 65.13 Social-cultural Mgmt Studies
(88)
0.09 0.01 78.13
Technology & Management (90) 0.08 0.01 62.19 Public Management (93) 0.06 0.03 76.23
Industrial Design (50) 0.12 0.22 70.60 Social Geography (84) 0.08 0.01 73.37
Aerospace Engineering (15) – 0.00 89.67
Average 0.09 0.03 75.05
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Robust estimation No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered estimation (j = 40) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
j ¼ 40 clusters. Absolute t values are given in parentheses. The results for specifications I–IV are obtained by clustered estimation
methods where each cluster is an education degree field (with nj[ 30 observations) when using BS_tertiary as the measure of skill
balance. Robust estimates are shown when using BS_secondary as the measure of skill balance. The results are similar when applying
robust (clustered) estimation instead of clustered (robust) estimation
***, **, * denote significance at the 1/5/10 %-level. The controls included in specifications II and IV are the same as in Table 2
Table 9 Self-employed entrepreneurship, risk aversion and skill balance: linear probability model estimates
Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
SB 0.1786* 0.1867* 0.1968** 0.2039**
(1.80) (1.89) (2.00) (2.07)
Risk aversion (kÞ 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004***
(2.77) (2.71) (3.34) (2.84)
N 2692 2669 2692 2669 3002 2975
R2 Adj. 0.0012 0.0055 0.0055 0.009 0.0034 0.0061
Control variables included No Yes No Yes No Yes
Robust estimation No No No No Yes Yes
Clustered estimation ( j = 40) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
See the notes below Table 3
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